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Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) repetition suppression, we explored the selectivity of the human action
perception system (APS), which consists of temporal, parietal and frontal areas, for the appearance and/or motion of the
perceived agent. Participants watched body movements of a human (biological appearance and movement), a robot (mechanical
appearance and movement) or an android (biological appearance, mechanical movement). With the exception of extrastriate
body area, which showed more suppression for human like appearance, the APS was not selective for appearance or motion
per se. Instead, distinctive responses were found to the mismatch between appearance and motion: whereas suppression effects
for the human and robot were similar to each other, they were stronger for the android, notably in bilateral anterior intraparietal
sulcus, a key node in the APS. These results could reflect increased prediction error as the brain negotiates an agent that appears
human, but does not move biologically, and help explain the  uncanny valley  phenomenon.
Keywords: functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); repetition suppression; action perception; predictive coding; temporal
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding others’ movements and actions is important
for many tasks of ecological significance, such as hunting
prey, avoiding predators, communication and social inter-
action. How humans and other animals achieve this has long
been of interest in psychology and neuroscience (Blake and
Shiffrar, 2007). In primates, perception of body movements
is thought to be supported by a network including lateral
superior temporal, inferior parietal and inferior frontal brain
areas. Neuroimaging studies have shown responses in these
areas during observation of actions; neuropsychological pa-
tient and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies
have shown that damage or disruption of these areas can
affect action processing (Saygin et al., 2004a; Pobric and
Hamilton, 2006; Grafton and Hamilton, 2007 Saygin, 2007;
Candidi et al., 2008). In non-human primates, at least two of
these regions have been reported to contain ‘mirror neu-
rons’, which fire during the execution as well as the
observation of specific movements (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). Hence, this network is sometimes referred
to as the mirror-neuron system (MNS). The exact relation-
ship between mirror neurons and brain areas that support
action perception in the human brain remains a topic of
debate (e.g. Dinstein et al., 2007; Chong et al., 2008; Kilner
et al., 2009; Mukamel et al., 2010). Accordingly, we will refer
to the brain areas most commonly discussed in relation to
action perception (i.e. lateral temporal, inferior frontal/ven-
tral premotor and anterior intraparietal cortex) more neu-
trally as the Action Perception System (APS), although of
course action perception may involve other parts of the
brain as well.
Observed neural activity in the APS is often interpreted
within the framework of motor resonance, whereby ‘an
action is understood when its observation causes the
motor system of the observer to “resonate”’ (Rizzolatti
et al., 2001). But what are the boundary conditions for this
resonance? How similar do the actors have to be with respect
to the observer to engage resonance?
On the one hand, it has been argued that closer the match
between the observed action and the observers’ own sensori-
motor representations, the stronger the resonance should be.
In support for this, there are links between activity within the
APS and whether the observer can perform the seen move-
ment (e.g. Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Cross et al., 2006;
Candidi et al., 2008). The appearance of the observed agent
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et al., 2007). On the other hand, responses in the APS can
appear surprisingly insensitive to the surface properties of the
viewed action stimuli. For example, in the human brain, parts
of the APS respond to actions and body movements of simple
animations (Pelphrey et al., 2003) or to point-light displays
(Saygin et al., 2004b). Indeed some researchers have sug-
gested that the system is sensitive to the action’s meaning,
but is relatively insensitive to the surface properties of the
sensory signals transmitting this information (Craighero
et al., 2007).
While humans have long been preoccupied with the
theme of creating other entities in their likeness (e.g. dolls,
marionettes, stories like the Golem, Frankenstein), with
technological advances, artificial agents such as humanoid
robots and 3D animated characters are becoming more
and more commonly encountered in daily life (Coradeschi
et al., 2006). Artificial agents can also provide scientists with
unique opportunities to test theories of human perception
and cognition. For example, robots can have appearance or
movement kinematics that are not biological, but can never-
theless be perceived as carrying out recognizable actions.
They can thus be used to study the functional properties
of the APS, such as whether the network is tuned selectively
to human-like appearance, or biological motion.
There is a small neuroscience literature on the perception
of actions of artificial agents, including robots.
Unfortunately, the results are not consistent to date. Some
studies have reported that artificial agents’ actions appar-
ently affect the observers’ own motor processing, or activity
within the APS, whereas others have argued that the APS
either does not respond, or responds weakly if the perceived
actor is not human (e.g. Kilner et al., 2003; Tai et al., 2004;
Chaminade and Hodgins, 2006; Catmur et al., 2007;
Chaminade et al., 2007; Gazzola et al., 2007; Oberman
et al., 2007; Press et al., 2007). The specific roles of biological
appearance vs biological motion have not been sufficiently
explored or separated in previous studies, even though this is
a topic of increasing interest in robotics, neuroscience and
vision science (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Chaminade
et al., 2007, 2010; Kanda et al., 2008; Jastorff and Orban,
2009; Saygin et al., 2010).
In the present study, our stimuli and experimental design
focused on whether the seen agent had biological (human-
like) appearance and also whether the agent’s body move-
ments were biological, plus whether their appearance and
movements matched. We also manipulated repetition of
successive actions, as explained below.
While our interest was focused on the APS, it was not
limited to these regions alone. For example, the involvement
of form processing in biological motion perception has also
been supported (e.g. Lange and Lappe, 2006). Our methods
allowed us to explore regions of the brain involved in body
movement perception without limiting our focus to the
nodes of the APS.
A novel aspect of this study was that we used a recently
developed, state-of-the-art android,
1 Repliee Q2. This was
important for several reasons. First, we did not want to
run the risk of using a robot that was not sufficiently an-
thropomorphic (Perani et al., 2001; Tai et al., 2004).
Furthermore, this and similar robots have ‘presence’ that
generally cannot be elicited by computer-animated artificial
agents (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005).
2 Finally, by using a
state of the art robot, we can engage more productively with
social robotics, a rapidly developing field (Dautenhahn,
2007; Kahn et al., 2007). As artificial agents become part of
our lives, appearing in a variety of domains from Hollywood
movies and video games, through to clinical and educational
settings (Aitkenhead and McDonald, 2006; Coradeschi et al.,
2006), research on how humans respond to such agents is
increasingly important (Saygin et al., 2010).
One key issue is what artificial agents should look like
(MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Seyama and Nagayama,
2007; Kanda et al., 2008). There is a wide range in what
people may consider as an animate agent, as exemplified
by well-known robots from cinema: from HAL’s single
camera eye, R2D2, Wall-E and Eva, which become surpris-
ingly expressive and likeable with simple but effective de-
signs, to more and more humanoid appearances such as
the Terminator, Robocop and the replicants of Blade Runner.
It may seem like a good idea to make artificial agents look
as human-like as possible, especially if they will be used in
social settings. However, we soon encounter the ‘uncanny
valley’: as an agent’s appearance is made more human-like,
people’s disposition toward it becomes more positive, until a
point at which increasing human-likeness leads to the agent
being considered strange, unfamiliar and disconcerting. This
phenomenon was prominently described in robotics (Mori,
1970), although there are early 20th century references to
related concepts [‘unheimlich’, Freud, 1919; Jentsch, 1995
(1906)]. More recently, the uncanny valley has increasingly
been experienced by the public when characters in movies or
video games appear to be ‘not quite right’. For example,
many viewers found characters in the animated film Polar
Express to be off-putting (Levi, 2004). Most modern an-
droids, including Repliee Q2 used here, are also thought to
fall into the uncanny valley (Ishiguro, 2006). Although the
uncanny valley remains an influential concept due to sub-
stantial anecdotal evidence, and its importance for the design
of artificial agents, there has been little systematic explor-
ation of the phenomenon or its neural basis (Seyama and
Nagayama, 2007; MacDorman et al., 2009a; Steckenfinger
and Ghazanfar, 2009).
Here, we hypothesized that the uncanny valley may, at
least partially, be caused by the violation of the brain’s
1The word android originates from a Greek root meaning ‘man’. This is a gender-specific root, but in present
day English the usage is generally gender neutral. When possible, we promote the use of ‘humanoid’ to refer
to artificial agents modeled after humans, but this word does not allow us to distinguish between our
experimental conditions in the present article.
2The scanner setup only allowed us to show a video of the robots to the subjects. Thus, while our setup did
not allow for full presence, we studied robots that have presence in their normal setting.
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lifetime of experience, the brain generates a prediction that
this appearance will be associated with a particular kind of
behavior (e.g. movement kinematics). When the behavior
of the agent violates the prediction, an error is generated
(see ‘Discussion’ section; Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston,
2010); although to be clear, prediction error is not the
same thing as consciously experienced surprise (Friston,
2005; Kiebel et al., 2009).
A related computational framework is provided by work
on internal models of motor control (Wolpert et al., 1995).
When we perform an action, we predict the sensory conse-
quences of that action through generative or forward models
(Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert and Miall, 1996). These pre-
dictions can be used to correct for unanticipated events, and
to account for sensory noise and delays. The models can be
recruited to infer the meaning of a perceived action given the
sensory information (Wolpert et al., 2003). During percep-
tion, the error between the prediction coming from in-
ternal models and incoming visual information can be
minimized by selecting models yielding accurate predictions,
that therefore correspond to the observed action (Kilner
et al., 2007).
To summarize, we performed functional magnetic reson-
ance imaging (fMRI) as participants viewed short video clips
of human or robotic agents carrying out recognizable
actions. To our knowledge, the present study is the first
neuroimaging investigation of action observation that has
used robots with different levels of humanoid appearance.
We used the android Repliee Q2, which has a very human-
like appearance. With brief exposures, Repliee Q2 can be
mistaken for a human being, but existing evidence indicates
an uncanny valley experience with more prolonged exposure
(Ishiguro, 2006). Importantly, we showed clips of Repliee Q2
both with its full human-like appearance, and also with a
mechanical appearance, after stripping the robot of its
human-like form, but retaining exactly the same mechan-
ical movements. We also showed clips of the real human
that Repliee Q2 was designed to replicate in appearance
(Figure 1). There were thus three Agent conditions:
Human, Android and Robot, which relate to our
experimental interests of appearance and motion as follows:
human and Android conditions feature biological (i.e.
human-like) surface appearance, whereas the Robot condi-
tion features a mechanical appearance. In terms of motion,
the Android and Robot feature nonhuman motion, whereas
biological motion is unique to the Human condition. In this
scheme, the Robot and the Human are different from each
other in both dimensions, while sharing a feature with the
Android. But from another perspective, the Robot and
the Human conditions are similar in that they both feature
congruent appearance and motion (looks human, moves
human; looks mechanical, moves mechanical) whereas the
Android features mismatching or incongruent appearance
and motion (looks human, moves mechanical).
One limitation for most fMRI studies on this topic to date
is that they compared the overall level of BOLD signal across
conditions. fMRI can be used to allow more refined infer-
ences regarding the neural representations underlying the
measured activity. A well-established approach involves
repetition suppression (also called fMRI adaptation): this
method has its origins in neurophysiology, and refers to
the phenomena of reduced neural response to a repeated
stimulus (Henson and Rugg, 2003; Grill-Spector et al.,
2006; Krekelberg et al., 2006). Repetition is thought to lead
to such reduced responses only in neurons selective for the
repeated properties, which allows the technique to be used as
a means to explore what is represented in a particular brain
region (e.g. motion direction sensitivity in area MT/V5
(Bartels et al., 2008)). Repetition suppression effects are
thought to reflect stimulus processing rather than task de-
mands (Xu et al., 2007) and observed attentional modula-
tions are not generic (Thompson and Duncan, 2009).
Recently, the repetition suppression approach has begun to
be applied to the study of action perception to identify func-
tional properties of the APS (e.g. Hamilton and Grafton,
2006, 2008; Dinstein et al., 2007; Chong et al., 2008; Fujii
et al., 2008; Lestou et al., 2008; Kilner et al., 2009).
The repetition suppression approach was ideally suited to
our goals. BOLD differences for the experimental conditions
(e.g. a main effect of Agent) can arise due to a number of
low-level stimulus factors such as differences in illumination,
Fig. 1 Still images from the videos used in the experiment, depicting the agents. (A) Robot, (B) Android and (C) Human.
Perceiving human and robot actions SCAN (2012) 415spatial frequency, color, or contrast that have little or noth-
ing to do with action processing, as well as nonspecific at-
tention or arousal effects. Instead, we focused on the
interaction between repetition suppression and our experi-
mental conditions.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty healthy adults (aged 20–36 years) participated. Data
from one participant could not be used due to excessive head
movement. All participants had normal or corrected vision,
no cognitive, attentional or neurological abnormalities by
self-report, and were right-handed. All participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with local ethics
approval.
Stimuli
Stimuli were video clips of actions performed by Repliee Q2
(in Android or Robot appearance, Figure 1A and B) and by
the human ‘master’, after whom Repliee Q2 was modeled
(Figure 1C). We refer to these agents as the Android, Robot
and Human conditions (even though the former two are in
fact the same robot).
Repliee Q2 has 42 degrees of freedom and can make head
and upper body movements. In its existing implementation,
it is impossible for this machine to exactly match the dy-
namics of human body movement (Pollick et al., 2005). The
actuators for Repliee Q2 were programmed over several
weeks at Osaka University. The same movements were
videotaped in two appearance conditions. For the Robot
condition, we removed as many of the surface elements of
Repliee Q2 as possible to reveal the materials underneath
(e.g. wiring, metal arms and joints). The silicone ‘skin’ on
the hands and face and some of the fine hair around the face
could not be removed and was covered. In the Robot con-
dition, Repliee Q2 could no longer be mistaken for a human
(Figure 1A).
Crucially, the kinematics of the movement for the
Android and Robot conditions were identical, since these
conditions in fact comprised the same robot, carrying out
the very same, programmed movements.
For the Human condition, we videotaped the female adult
whose face was molded and used in constructing Repliee Q2.
She was asked to watch each of the Repliee Q2’s actions and
then perform the same action naturally.
All agents were videotaped in the same room and with the
same background. A total of eight actions per actor were
used in the fMRI experiment, including both transitive
(drinking water from a cup, picking up a piece of paper from
a table, grasping a tube of hand lotion, wiping a table with a
cloth) and intransitive actions [waving hand, nodding
affirmatively, shaking head (to convey no) and introducing
self (Japanese bow)]. Video recordings were digitized, con-
verted to grayscale and cropped to 400 400 pixels.
A semi-transparent white fixation cross (40 pixels across)
was superimposed at the center of the movies.
Experimental procedures and data analysis
MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) and the Cogent
toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent) were used for stimu-
lus presentation and response collection.
Each participant was given exactly the same introduction
to the study and the same exposure to the videos prior to
scanning, because prior knowledge can affect judgments of
artificial agents differentially (Saygin and Cicekli, 2002). To
minimize possible effects of familiarity or expertise on our
results, we only recruited participants who had no experi-
ence working with robots, had not spent time in Japan, nor
had close friends or family from Japan (MacDorman et al.,
2009b). At the start of the study, subjects viewed each
movie once outside of the scanner, and were told whether
each agent was a human or a robot. They were not uncertain
about the identity of the android by the time scanning took
place.
Each participant was scanned in 6 445-s runs of the ex-
periment, each comprising 12 blocks. Each block contained
12 videos from Human, Android or Robot conditions, pre-
sented in blocked counterbalanced order. Repetitions were
event related. Videos were 2s long and were separated by
500ms. Each clip was equiprobably a repeat of the previous
clip or a nonrepeat. Repetition intervals were kept constant
between the conditions. Repetition suppression was calcu-
lated as the difference between BOLD response to a new
(nonrepeated) stimuli compared with the response to the
same stimulus when it was repeated. Positive suppression
means there was less response to repeated stimuli.
Additional illustrations of the experiment are shown in
Supplementary Figure S1.
To ensure sustained attention, every 30s, participants were
presented with a written statement about which they had to
make a True/False judgment (e.g. ‘I did not see her waving’)
using an MRI compatible keypad. Participants had a
maximum of 4s to respond to each statement. We explored
with a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
whether accuracy varied across conditions (it did not).
Participants were instructed to keep their eyes on the fix-
ation cross as much as possible, except at the end of the
blocks when they read the statements. We used an
MR-compatible eye tracker (see Supplementary Data) to
check whether eye movements differed between conditions
(they did not).
We used a 3T Siemens Allegra scanner and a standard
gradient echo pulse sequence. fMRI data were analysed
with SPM 5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) using stand-
ard procedures (see Supplementary Data for details).
Although there is no agreed-upon localizer for the APS
(Grafton and Hamilton, 2007), we selected regions of inter-
est (ROIs), while also avoiding nonindependence errors
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) using the main effect of Repetition.
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we explored contrasts of interest (Agent by Repetition inter-
action). We identified regions showing repetition sup-
pression (Nonrepeat>Repeat) at t 8.86; P<0.05 false
discovery rate (FDR) corrected, with a cluster size of at
least 30 voxels (Table 1), and extracted percent signal change
within a sphere of 5mm radius around these peaks for each
condition from each subject’s first level analysis, and tested
the Agent by Repetition interaction with an ANOVA. In a
balanced factorial design with equiprobable conditions
(as was used here), this process does not bias the chances
of finding an interaction (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009).
In reporting the effects, P-values were calculated two-
tailed, and were corrected for multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
Behavioral and eye movement data
Mean Accuracy for the comprehension questions was 0.84
(s.d.¼0.28). Accuracy did not differ between conditions
(P>0.1 for all pair-wise comparisons). None of the eye
movement measures (Mean and s.d. of x and y position,
Pupil size) differed between conditions (P>0.1 for all pair-
wise comparisons). These data indicate comparisons across
Table 1 Repetition suppression results from the whole brain random effects analysis
Anatomical description BA Peak (MNI) Z Mean RS (% Signal) Agent differences
xyz Robot Android Human
Temporal cortex
Lateral temporal cortex (EBA) 37, 22  48  72 6 7.47 0.51 1.20 1.08 Agent repetition (P¼0.03)
H>R(P¼0.07)
A>R( P¼0.02)
50  64 0 6.94 0.85 1.07 0.95 None
Fusiform gyrus 46  44  16 4.02 0.22 0.87 0.41 Agent repetition (P¼0.075)
A>R( P¼0.01)
A>H( P¼0.05)
 44  44  18 3.54 0.21 0.69 0.42 A>R(P¼0.06)
Occipital cortex
V1/V2 17, 18 16  88 2 5.86  0.79  0.88  0.73 None
 12  94 2 5.73  0.81  0.87  0.85 None
Parietal cortex
sIPS 71 8  72 60 4.93 0.29 0.88 0.51 A>R( P¼0.03)
 20  70 60 4.57 0.23 1.06 0.55 Agent repetition (P¼0.04)
A>R( P¼0.01)
A>H(P¼0.1)
aIPS 40  42  38 42 3.96 0.30 0.81 0.42 Agent repetition (P¼0.002)
A>R( P¼0.002)
A>H( P¼0.004)
42  36 42 4.37 0.22 0.93 0.39 Agent repetition (P¼0.002)
A>R( P¼0.003)
A>H( P¼0.02)
Cuneus (pIPS) 19 24  84 44 3.51 0.41 0.38 0.48 None
 28  82 40 3.63 0.41 0.41 0.39 None
Frontal cortex
Middle Frontal Gyrus 10  44 52 12 4.12 0.66 0.57 0.27 None
10 46 50  12 4.10 0.46 0.41 0.55 None
46 50 48 10 3.93 0.58 0.80 0.22 A>H(P¼0.07)
6 44 8 54 3.91 0.27 0.58 0.64 None
Other
Parahippocampal/Amygdala 26  4  18 3.99 0.10 0.68 0.75 A>R(P¼0.09)
H>R(P¼0.08)
 28  6  20 3.69 0.20 0.58 0.66 None
Temporoparietal junction (TPJ) 40 60  40 26 3.83 0.29 0.54 0.57 None
40, 13  48  38 28 3.43 0.54 0.44 0.27 None
Cerebellum 8  44  18 3.69 0.48 0.49 0.46 None
Paracentral 5 4  36 70 3.64 0.19 0.52 0.50 None
Postcentral gyrus 3 70  8 24 3.45 0.41 0.45 0.35 None
Anatomical description and Brodmann Areas (BA) and the peak MNI coordinates are reported for each region in which the main effect of RS was significant (P<0.05, FDR
corrected and minimum cluster size of 30 voxels). Mean repetition suppression (percentage of signal change for Nonrepeat–Repeat, see ‘Methods’ section) for the three agents at
these peaks are reported, along with any significant statistical differences (as measured using repeated measures ANOVA). We also noted pair-wise agent differences that were
significant (P<0.05 corrected, two tailed), and in italics, those that fell short of significance but with a tendency (P<0.1, corrected, two tailed, denoted in italics). Significant
Agent by Repetition interactions are marked in bold, and are also plotted in Figure 3.
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movement confounds.
FMRI data
There were notable differences in repetition suppression be-
tween the agents, with the Human and Robot conditions
leading to similar patterns of suppression, but the Android
condition being distinctive, and leading to repetition sup-
pression in a wider network (Figure 2). All agent conditions
revealed repetition suppression in lateral temporal cortex.
For the Android condition, repetition suppression was also
evident in additional regions, notably in parietal and frontal
cortex.
To confirm and quantify these results, we performed ROI
analyses. Broadly consistent with previous repetition sup-
pression studies of action perception, the main effect of
Repetition revealed a network of areas, including occipital,
lateral and ventral temporal, parietal, frontal, parahippocam-
pal and cerebellar regions (Figure 3 and Table 1). All showed
reduced responses to the repeated stimuli, with the exception
of primary visual cortex, which showed repetition enhance-
ment. Repetition suppression was found in the parietal and
temporal nodes of the APS, but despite being a key node of
the APS, ventral premotor cortex did not show significant
repetition suppression (cf Chong et al., 2008; Lestou et al.,
2008; Grossman et al., 2010). There were other repetition
suppression foci in frontal cortex, including one that
extended into dorsal premotor cortex.
Since our main interest was differential responses to the
three agents (and the stimulus dimensions they represent,
i.e. biological appearance and motion), we tested whether
the repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant Agent
by Repetition interaction. Even though there was qualitative-
ly more suppression for the Android condition compared
with the others in a widespread network (Figure 2), the
Agent by Repetition interaction reached significance in
only a subset of these regions (Table 1).
Figure 3 depicts repetition suppression as percent signal
change in the peaks where the interaction was significant.
In three parietal peaks, suppression was stronger for the
Android condition than for the Human and Robot con-
ditions: anterior intraparietal sulcus bilaterally (aIPS,
Figure 3A and C), and a more posterior and superior parietal
region (sIPS, Figure 3B) in the left hemisphere.
The Agent by Repetition interaction was also significant in
left lateral temporal cortex, where we observed greater repe-
tition suppression for the Human and Android conditions
than for the Robot condition (Figure 3D). There was a large
Fig. 2 Repetition suppression. Whole-brain repetition suppression effect for (A) Robot, (B) Android and (C) Human conditions rendered on the lateral views of the cortical surface
of each hemisphere.
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areas, but the interaction was present only in one subpeak,
the coordinates of which corresponded to the previously
reported location of the extrastriate body area (EBA)
(Peelen and Downing, 2007), a region that responds more
strongly to images of bodies and body parts compared with
other kinds of stimuli. The right hemisphere peak, and a
more dorsal subpeak of the left hemisphere cluster, did not
show significant differences between agents.
For completeness, we also report the main effect of Agent:
this effect was found in visual cortex bilaterally (with peaks
in MNI coordinates  30,  92, 2 and 38,  80,  16), and was
driven by a stronger response for the Robot condition com-
pared with the other agents. These differences almost cer-
tainly reflect low-level visual differences between the stimuli
(e.g. higher contrast, spatial frequency), demonstrating the
advantage of using a repetition paradigm.
DISCUSSION
Summary of study and findings
We conducted this study as part of our general goal of iden-
tifying the functional properties of brain systems that allow
us to understand others’ body movements and actions
(Saygin et al., 2004b; Saygin, 2007). Subjects viewed actions
performed by three agents that represented our experimental
factors of interest: Human (biological motion and appear-
ance), Android (biological appearance, nonbiological
motion) and Robot (same agent as the Android, but
‘skinned’ to reveal the internal mechanics, nonbiological ap-
pearance and motion).
There was little evidence for specificity for biological
motion or appearance per se in our data. Even though
the nervous system processes form and motion in partially
segregated systems, these attributes are inextricably intercon-
nected (Shepard, 2001) and for action perception, the inte-
gration of motion and form cues may be a natural and
critical aspect of the underlying computations.
There was a significant Agent by Repetition interaction in
the anterior portion of the intraparietal sulcus bilaterally,
corresponding to area aIPS, the putative human homologue
of macaque area AIP (Grefkes and Fink, 2005; Culham and
Valyear, 2006; Grafton and Hamilton, 2007). Here, suppres-
sion effects were larger for the Android compared with both
the Human and the Robot conditions (Figure 3).
We found one region in left posterior lateral temporal
cortex, where suppression for the Robot condition was sig-
nificantly less than that for the human and the android, the
two agents with human-like surface appearance. The peak
location in this cluster corresponded the EBA (Peelen and
Downing, 2007), consistent with the role of form-based pro-
cessing in action perception (e.g. Lange and Lappe, 2006).
Predictive coding
We suggest that our results, especially the distinctive effects
for the Android condition, can be reconciled with the ‘pre-
dictive coding’ framework of neural processing (e.g. Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005, 2010; Kilner et al., 2007; Jakobs
et al., 2009), which is based on minimization of prediction
error among the levels of a cortical hierarchy. The key idea in
this context is that brain activity will be higher for a stimulus
that is not well-predicted or explained by a generative neural
model of the external causes for sensory states (Friston,
2010). Predictive coding fits well with the view of perception
as an active process that involves generating predictions
about the environment, as well as the brain’s own states
(e.g. Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Bar, 2009; Barsalou, 2009).
Fig. 3 Interactions. The top panel shows the main effect of Repetition (irrespective of Agent) rendered on the lateral views of the cortical hemispheres. The graphs depict the
repetition suppression effect in all the peaks in which there was a significant interaction of Repetition by Agent (see Table 1 for statistics). Y-axes are percent signal change
(Nonrepeat - Repeat).
Perceiving human and robot actions SCAN (2012) 419We have a lifetime of experience that associates human
appearance with biological motion, and machines (such as
robots) with mechanical motion. For both our Human con-
dition and our Robot condition, the observed motion kine-
matics was congruent with what would be predicted from
the appearance of the agent. For the Android, however, there
was a mismatch between the human-like appearance and the
mechanical motion, leading to a larger prediction error,
manifest as activity in relevant brain regions. A closer look
at the data showed that responses to the nonrepeated videos
were significantly greater for the Android compared with the
other agents (Supplementary Figure S2), further supporting
this interpretation. The prediction error would be smaller
when a stimulus was preceded by the same stimulus, con-
sistent with neural models of repetition suppression
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Friston, 2005; Grill-Spector
et al., 2006).
The differences between agent types for repetition effects
were most pronounced in parietal cortex. The aIPS, being
the anatomical link between the posterior, visual compo-
nents of the APS and the anterior, motor components
(Petrides and Pandya, 1988; Seltzer and Pandya, 1994;
Matelli and Luppino, 2001; Rozzi et al., 2006), is ideally
located to generate sensory predictions in this network. To
describe the flow of information in the system, more time-
resolved measurement techniques should be used, such as
electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetoencephalography
(MEG), as we are doing in related work.
Predictive coding not only provides a satisfactory inter-
pretation of the current data, but also couches them in a
framework that has both established and growing support
in neuroscience (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005; Bar,
2009). We speculate that the present results reflect relatively
general principles of neural organization, but also that the
prediction errors may be dependent on how narrowly tuned
the nervous system is for a particular domain. Future
work should explore whether the perception of our conspe-
cifics is an especially narrowly tuned domain, based on its
evolutionary importance, and/or our extensive experience
of interacting with conspecifics.
Contribution to the understanding of the
uncanny valley
The uncanny valley has many potential dimensions
(MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006; Ho and MacDorman,
2010; Pollick, 2009). Our experiments and similar studies
(e.g. Steckenfinger and Ghazanfar, 2009) were not designed
in an optimum fashion to ‘explain’ the uncanny valley and as
such can only make a modest contribution to defining its
neural basis. However, the present results suggest an intri-
guing link between brain responses in the APS and the un-
canny valley. While the android used in our study is often
mistaken for a human at first sight, longer exposure and
dynamic viewing has been linked to the uncanny valley
(Ishiguro, 2006). In a predictive coding account of action
perception, the android is not predictable an agent with
that appearance (human) would typically not move mech-
anically. When the nervous system is presented with ‘the
thing that should not be’ [Lovecraft, 1984 (1936); Hetfield
et al., 1986], a propagation of prediction error may occur in
the APS. While we cannot state a conclusive or causal link
between prediction error and the uncanny valley based on
the present data, we suggest this framework may contribute
to an explanation for the uncanny valley.
Toward an interdisciplinary science of social
perception
Humanoid robots and artificial agents are increasingly part
of our daily lives (Kanda et al., 2004; Dautenhahn, 2007;
Tapus et al., 2007). With application in domains such as
healthcare, education, communications, entertainment and
the arts, exploring human factors in the design and develop-
ment of artificial agents is ever more important. This will
require an interdisciplinary approach, to which we have con-
tributed new data from cognitive neuroscience.
The present study is only a beginning. Computational
modeling, ideally in conjunction with neuroimaging, will
be important to specify or constrain the mechanisms under-
lying action perception, and to link this work with estab-
lished frameworks of sensorimotor control (Wolpert et al.,
1995, 2003; Kawato, 1999; Kilner et al., 2007). Predictive
coding can be used to specify new hypotheses to explore
further the interplay between appearance and motion of arti-
ficial agents, and to extend the approach to sensory integra-
tion more broadly. For example, it is possible that we have
some prior idea of how robots should move perhaps as
evidenced by professionals making money by painting them-
selves gold, standing in front of cathedrals and moving like
robots and similar patterns of prediction errors for viewed
actions might be generated for humans moving like robots
(cf Shimada, 2010) or more generally, for other kinds of
expectation violations between appearance and motion.
Alternatively, the effects observed here could be specific to
the perception of animate, or biologically relevant entities.
Computer animation will be used to manipulate appearance
and movement more parametrically and address these and
similar questions in future work.
Despite many unknowns, our results already suggest an
interpretation for the classic anecdotal reports of the un-
canny valley effect. Psychologists have long pointed out
those aspects of our physical experience that shape our per-
ceptual systems (Gibson, 1979; Barlow, 2001). It has also
long been acknowledged that violating perceptual expect-
ations can have striking effects, compellingly illustrated by
perceptual illusions (e.g. Gregory, 1980). As human-like arti-
ficial agents become more commonplace, perhaps our per-
ceptual systems will be retuned to accommodate these new
social partners. Or perhaps, we will decide it is not a good
idea to make them so closely in our image after all.
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